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SINCE  the  early  1970s  the number  of U. S. companies  involved  in mergers, 
acquisitions,  and other types of ownership  change has increased  mark- 
edly:  from  926  completed  transactions  in 1974  to 2,326  in 1981,  and  4,024 
in 1986.  The number  has in effect doubled  about  every six or seven years 
(table 1). And the value of the companies involved increased almost 
sixfold  between 1980  and 1986,  far outpacing  the 33 percent  increase  in 
the consumer  price index and the 17 percent increase in the producer 
price  index. These developments  have stimulated  intense debate  on the 
consequences of changes in ownership,  particularly  for economic effi- 
ciency. The debate has potentially important  policy implications,  be- 
cause a considerable  amount of federal and state legislation aimed at 
restricting  mergers and acquisitions, especially those resulting from 
hostile takeovers, has been proposed.' Whether such legislation is 
This  paper  is based  on work  supported  by the  National  Science  Foundation  under  grant 
SES 84-01460,  conducted at the U.S.  Bureau of the Census while the authors were 
participants  in the American  Statistical  Association/National  Science Foundation/Census 
Bureau research program.  We are grateful  to Martin  Baily, Dale Jorgenson, Edwin 
Mansfield,  Clifford  Winston,  and  other  conference  participants  for helpful  comments. 
1. One  proposal,  for  example,  would  eliminate  the tax deductibility  of interest  on  junk 
bonds,  which  are  used to finance  takeovers.  According  to many  observers,  including  the 
Brady Commission,  consideration  of this legislation by the House Ways and Means 
Committee  was a major  factor  precipitating  the stock market  plunge  in October  1987. 
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Table 1.  Mergers and Acquisitions Completed, 1972-86a 
Percent  Percent 
change from  Value  change from 
previous  (millions of  previous 
Year  Transactions  year  dollars)  year 
1972  1,263  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
1973  1,064  -  15.8  n.a.  n.a. 
1974  926  -  12.9  n.a.  n.a. 
1975  981  6.0  n.a.  n.a. 
1976  1,145  17.0  n.a.  n.a. 
1977  1,209  5.6  n.a.  n.a. 
1978  1,452  20.1  n.a.  n.a. 
1979  1,529  5.3  34,177  n.a. 
1980  1,565  2.4  32,959  -  3.6 
1981  2,326  48.6  67,209  103.9 
1982  2,297  -  1.2  60,402  -  10.1 
1983  2,385  3.8  52,536  -  13.0 
1984  3,144  31.8  125,693  139.3 
1985  3,397  8.0  144,284  14.8 
1986  4,024  18.4  190,512  32.0 
Source:  Mergers anid  Acquiisitionis, vol.  21 (May-June  1987), p. 57. 
n.a.  Not  available. 
a.  A transaction is included if it involves  a U.S.  company and is valued at more than $1 million. Partial acquisitions 
and divestments  of 5 percent or more of a company's  capital stock are included if payments  of more than $1 million 
are made.  Real property sales and transfers are excluded. 
desirable  depends  to an important  extent on whether  ownership  change 
increases  or decreases  efficiency. 
Various studies have attempted  to determine  the effect of mergers 
and acquisitions  on efficiency, and most have used data at the level of 
the individual  firm to examine the effects on such variables as stock 
prices, profits,  and market  share.2  Our  methodological  approach  differs 
in two important  respects: the level of aggregation  of the data and our 
metric of efficiency. We investigate the determinants  and effects of 
ownership  change  at the level of the individual  plant  by examining  the 
2. The effects of mergers  on stock  prices  are  examined  in Paul  J. Halpern,  "Empirical 
Estimates  of the Amount  and  Distribution  of Gains  to Companies  in Mergers,"  Journal of 
Business,  vol. 46  (October  1973),  pp. 554-75;  Halpern,  "Corporate  Acquisitions:  A Theory 
of Special Cases? A Review of Event Studies Applied to Acquisitions," Journal  of 
Finance,  vol. 38 (May  1983),  pp. 297-317;  and  Michael  Jensen  and  Richard  Ruback,  "The 
Market  for Corporate  Control,"  Journal of Financial Economics,  vol. 11  (April  1983),  pp. 
1-53. Profitability  and mergers  are considered  in Thomas  F. Hogarty,  "The Profitability 
of Corporate  Mergers,"  Journal of Business,  vol. 43 (July 1970),  pp. 317-27;  Ronald  W. 
Melicher and David F. Rush, "Evidence on the Acquisition-Related  Performance  of Frank R. Lichtenberg  and Donrald Siegel  645 
behavior of total factor productivity.  This research design offers two 
significant  advantages.  First, the data  allow us to examine  the effects of 
certain  transactions  that  have not been observed  before. Because many 
ownership changes involve only parts of companies or even parts of 
divisions of companies, it is very difficult  to assess the impact  of such 
partial  acqusitions  and  divestitures  using  financial  data  at the level of the 
company  or even of the line of business. Second, there is a consensus 
that the best way to measure  the efficiency of an enterprise  (or of an 
economic system)  is to measure  its total factor  productivity. 
This  paper  analyzes  the relationship  between  total  factor  productivity 
and ownership  change, using Census Bureau  data on more than 18,000 
relatively  large  plants  throughout  the U.S. manufacturing  sector. About 
21 percent  of the plants  changed  owners at least once during  a ten-year 
period.  The data  enable  us to compare,  both before  and  after  ownership 
change, the productivity  of these plants  with that of plants in the same 
industry  that  have not changed  owners. 
This methodology allows us to address an important  issue in the 
current  debate:  Do the gains that typically  accrue to shareholders  from 
changes in ownership benefit society as a whole or are they merely 
private gains? A large body of empirical  evidence on the combined 
market  values of acquiring  and acquired  companies suggests that take- 
overs have a positive net effect on stockholder  wealth.3  But are these 
private or social gains? Andrei Shleifer and Lawrence H. Summers 
argue  that takeovers  may harm  those who have a stake in a company's 
performance-workers, suppliers, the government, the surrounding 
community-through layoffs, lower wages, abrogated  contracts with 
suppliers,  and lost tax revenues.4  They contend that increases in stock 
prices associated  with mergers  merely  reflect  a transfer  of wealth from 
Conglomerate  Firms,"  Journal of Finance,  vol. 29 (March  1974),  pp. 1941-49;  and  J. Fred 
Weston  and  Surendra  K. Mansinghka,  "Tests of the Efficiency  Performance  of Conglom- 
erate  Firms,"  Journal  of Finance, vol. 26 (September  1971),  pp. 919-36. The impact  of 
mergers  on market  shares  is discussed  in  Dennis  C. Mueller,  "Mergers  and  Market  Share," 
Review ofEconomnics  andStatistics,  vol. 67 (May 1985), pp. 259-67; and Robert McGuckin, 
Stephen  Andrews,  and  James  Monahan,  "The  Efficiency  of Conglomerate  Mergers:  New 
Evidence  from  Longitudinal  Research  Data  Base," paper  presented  at  the  National  Bureau 
of Economics  Research  Summer  Institute  on Productivity,  1987. 
3. See Jensen  and  Ruback,  "Market  for Corporate  Control." 
4. Andrei  Shleifer  and Lawrence  H. Summers,  "Hostile Takeovers  as Breaches of 
Trust,"  unpublished  paper  (1987). 646  Brookinigs Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
a firm's  stakeholders  to its shareholders.  An opposing  view argues  that 
acquisitions  engender  social  gains  because  plants  are  then  operated  more 
efficiently.  An analysis of the relationship  between takeovers and total 
factor  productivity  allows  the  validity  of these  two views to be considered 
and  compared. 
The remainder  of this paper  is organized  as follows. First, we discuss 
some of the major  theories  on the efficiency  of corporate  takeovers. We 
then  advance  a "matching"  theory  of ownership  change,  which  borrows 
heavily  from  the  theory  of labor  turnoverformulated  by Boyan  Jovanovic 
and others.5  The next section presents the salient  characteristics  of the 
Longitudinal  Establishment  Data Time Series file, which is used to test 
the validity  of the theory. This section also describes how the LED file 
can be used to measure  three key variables  in our analysis: ownership 
change, growth of total factor productivity  (the proxy for changes in 
economic efficiency),  and  initial  productivity.  The final  sections present 
empirical  results, summarize  conclusions, and provide suggestions  for 
research. 
Theories of Ownership Change 
Many theories of ownership  change have been proposed, each with 
different  implications  for how mergers  and  acquisitions  affect economic 
performance.  In the neoclassical tradition, J. E. Meade argued that 
corporate  takeovers  promote  economic  natural  selection. Efficient  firms 
survive (that is, they remain  autonomous)  while inefficient  companies 
are  taken  over.  The  threat  of takeover  causes managers  to try  to maximize 
profits. Henry Manne  contended that the threat  of takeover is serious 
because ownership  change provides a way of getting rid of ineffective 
managers. In a similar vein, Michael Jensen asserted that mergers 
increase the efficiency of resource  allocation  and provide  a framework 
for ensuring  that  management  will act to maximize  shareholder  wealth.6 
5. Boyan  Jovanovic,  "Job  Matching  and  the  Theory  of Turnover,"  Jollrnal  ofPolitical 
Economy,  vol. 87 (October  1979),  pt. 1, pp. 972-90. 
6. J. E. Meade, "Is the New Industrial  State  Inevitable?"  Economic  Jolurnal, vol. 78 
(June 1968), pp. 372-92; Henry G. Manne, "Mergers  and the Market  for Corporate 
Control," Joutrnal  of Political Economy,  vol. 73 (April 1965), pp. 110-20; and Michael C. 
Jensen, "The Takeover  Controversy:  Analysis and Evidence," in John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Louis Lowenstein,  and Susan Rose-Ackerman,  eds.,  Knights, Raiders, and Targets: The 
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In contrast, Dennis C. Mueller contended that corporate leaders 
pursue  a policy of growth  rather  than maximization  of profit  or stock- 
holder wealth.7 Executive compensation is often based on revenue 
increases, and because of imperfections  in capital  markets,  large firms 
are  less likely  to be taken  over. Consistent  with  this  notion  of management 
empire  building,  Richard  Roll argued  that the net effect of mergers  is to 
reduce stockholder  wealth because acquiring  firms systematically  ov- 
erestimate  the value  of their  targets.  He attributed  this myopic  behavior 
to the hubris  of top-level  executives.8 
Michael  Gort's  theory  of economic disturbance  implied  that  mergers 
have a neutral  effect on efficiency. His model treated  assets transferred 
through  ownership  change  in the same manner  as other  income-produc- 
ing assets. Mergers,  he argued,  are caused mainly  by divergent  expec- 
tations:  the acquiring  and acquired  firms  have vastly different  percep- 
tions of the present value of the target company's stock, based on 
different  expectations  about  future  levels and sources of income. These 
discrepancies, he added, are more likely to occur during  periods of 
economic  disturbance-bull markets  or rapid  technological  change.9 
These theories, of course, do not constitute a complete summary  of 
merger  motives. Other reasons for takeovers frequently  cited include 
the drive  for monopoly  power and  the desire to achieve tax savings.  '? 
A "Matching" Theory of Ownership Change 
We  believe ownership  change  is primarily  a mechanism  for correcting 
lapses  of efficiency.  Most  acquisitions  are  precipitated  by a deterioration 
7.  Dennis C. Mueller,  "A Theory  of Conglomerate Mergers,"  Qluarterly  Journal of 
Economics,  vol.  83 (November  1969), pp. 643-59.  Similar ideas  are expressed  in John 
Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State (Houghton Mifflin, 1967); and Robin Marris, 
The Economic Theory of "Managerial"  Capitalism (Free Press of Glencoe,  1964). 
8.  Richard Roll,  "The  Hubris  Hypothesis  of  Corporate  Takeovers,"  Journal  of 
Business,  vol. 59 (April 1986), pp. 197-216. 
9.  Michael Gort, "An Economic  Disturbance Theory of Mergers,"  Qluarterly  Jouirnal 
of Economics, vol. 83 (November  1969), pp. 624-42.  Gort's model is essentially a variation 
of the theme of maximizing stockholder wealth. The market expects  no gain to result from 
the merger because acquirers have expectations  different from those of the market. The 
premium earned by the acquired firm is therefore exactly  offset by a loss to the acquiring 
firm's shareholders. 
10. See Alan Auerbach and David Reishus,  "The Effects  of Taxation on the Merger 
Decision,"  unpublished paper (1987). 648  Br  ookings Papers  oni Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
in the target  firm's  economic peiformance. Deteriorating  productivity 
provides  an important  signal  to a plant's  owner that  for some reason he 
is operating  in a less efficient  manner  than an alternative  parent  could. 
This may  be due  to an inherent  incompatibility  between  plant  and  owner 
(a comparative  disadvantage)  or an overall lack of managerial  compe- 
tence (an  absolute  disadvantage). 
To account for the sources of incompatibility  between plant and 
parent  company,  we note the striking  similarity  between their relation- 
ship and  the one between  workers  and employers. In the  job separation 
model  advanced  by Boyan  Jovanovic, the employee's true  productivity 
in a given firm  is unknown  before he or she is hired. The employer's 
knowledge of the worker's ability improves as job tenure increases. 
Heterogeneous  groups  of workers and employers thus continually  en- 
gage in a matching  process, and experience provides important  new 
information  concerning  the quality  of the match.  1I1 
We believe that the theory of ownership  change or plant  turnover  is 
closely related  to the matching  theory  of  job turnover.  Before acquiring 
or building  a plant, corporations  (especially well-diversified  ones) have 
incomplete information  about the true levels of efficiency of these 
heterogeneous  plants.  The companies  are interested  only in maintaining 
control of establishments  they can manage effectively. In this sense, 
firms  are  constantly  evaluating  the match  or  fit  between  plant  and  parent. 
More  precise information  about the quality of the match develops the 
longer  a firm  operates  a plant. 
The matching  theory  of plant  turnover  entails  three  primary  assump- 
tions. 
-Some  owners  enjoy  a comparative  advantage  with  respect  to certain 
plants. The source of a firm's  comparative  advantage  may be a combi- 
nation of its managerial  expertise, technological skill, and ability to 
exploit opportunities  for economies of scale or scope. 
-The  quality  of the match  is the major  determinant  of the corporate- 
11.  Jovanovic,  "Job Matching and the Theory  of Turnover."  Evidence  consistent 
with the matching model of job  separation was provided in Katharine G. Abraham and 
Henry S. Farber, "Job Duration, Seniority, and Earnings," American Economolic Rev,iew, 
vol.  77 (June 1987), pp. 278-97;  and Joseph  G. Altonji and Robert A.  Shakotko,  "Do 
Wages Rise with Job Seniority?"  Revieii' of Economic  Stuidies, vol.  54 (July 1987), pp. 
437-59. These authors found that the positive correlation between job tenure and earnings 
is actually caused  by the association  between job  tenure and an unobservable  variable 
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level decision to maintain  or relinquish  ownership  of an establishment. 
In this regard,  we need not assume that there are good owners and bad 
owners or plants  but only that  there  are good and  bad  matches.  12 
-The  quality  of the match  is indexed  by total  factor  productivity,  our 
measure  of efficiency, which is a good whose quality  is determined  by 
experience.  Owners  cannot  determine  the  efficiency  of plants  in  advance. 
The nature  of their  comparative  advantage  becomes evident  only as they 
operate  the facilities. 
The following  illustration  describes  the matching  process. Plants  and 
their owners are matched  initially  at time 0. Match quality, and hence 
productivity, varies randomly. The lower the plant productivity is, 
relative to the mean level of efficiency in the industry, the higher the 
probability  of ownership  change. Because of transactions  costs associ- 
ated with selling a plant, there is a threshold  below which the relative 
efficiency  of the plant  must  fall before  a change  in ownership  is sensible. 
When  an ownership  change  does occur, even an average  match  leads to 
above-average  growth  in productivity  or an increase  in efficiency. 
The matching  theory  of plant  turnover  has two major  implications. 
-A  low level of productivity, which indicates a poor match, will 
induce  a change  in ownership. 
-A  change in ownership  will result in an increase in productivity. 
The quality of each match, which is measured by the level of plant 
productivity,  is assumed  to be randomly  distributed.  13  Thus  the expected 
value  of a new match  (from  an identical  distribution)  is higher,  given that 
the first  match  was low. 
Data 
Our analysis of the determinants  and effects of changes in plant 
ownership  is based on the Longitudinal  Establishment  Data (LED) file. 
This  file, which  brings  together  data  from  the Annual  Survey  and  Census 
of Manufactures  collected by the U.S. Bureau  of the Census, is used to 
12. This implies  that firms  with an absolute  disadvantage  are sold because they will 
have  all bad  matches. 
13. In practice,  of course, the quality  of the match  may  be somewhat  predictable.  We 
abstract  from  this by focusing  on the unpredictable  component  of the variation  in match 
quality. 650  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 3:1987 
mneasure  productivity  at the plant  level. The file is the richest source of 
annual  data collected from manufacturing  establishments, containing 
detailed  information  on output  and  inputs. 
We analyze a balanced  extract of the full LED file, called the LED 
Time Series file. In this data set, 20,493  manufacturing  plants  owned by 
more than 5,700 firms were observed annually  from 1972 to 1981. A 
Census Bureau coverage code was provided in all years, allowing 
changes in corporate  ownership  to be identified.  Each plant was also 
assigned  a four-digit  standard  industrial  classification  (SIC)  code based 
on its primary  product and a code identifying  the ultimate corporate 
owner. Table 2 shows the LED Time Series sample and the total 
manufacturing  sector population employment, plants, and values of 
shipments. The plants account for 67 percent of the total value of 
manufacturing  shipments  and 55 percent of employment.  Among two- 
digit SICs (not shown), the industries  with the highest percentages  of 
plants included  in the sample  are primary  metals, petroleum,  tobacco, 
textiles, paper,  and  chemicals. 
From both cross-sectional  and time-series  perspectives, the owner- 
ship changes  recorded  in the data set constitute  a nonrandom  sample  of 
all postwar  ownership  changes.  The LED Time Series file contains  data 
only for continuously  operating  plants  that  were included  in the Annual 
Survey  of Manufacturers  (ASM)  sample  throughout  the 1972-81  period. 
The 1977  Census of Manufactures  (basically, the complete population 
of manufacturing  plants)  included  350,648  plants.  The 1981  ASM sample 
(hence the full LED file) included 55,054 plants, and the LED Time 
Series  file  20,493.  The  difference  between  the LED file  and  its time series 
extract is due to plant  failures  and changes in the ASM sample, which 
was redrawn  in 1974  and again in 1979. The unique cross-section and 
time-series  aspects  of these establishments  with  respect  to the  population 
of manufacturing  plants will be examined in detail below. Given the 
nonrandom distribution  of  the plants we  observed, the ownership 
changes involving them are nonrepresentative.  This issue will also be 
addressed. 
The cross-section  in the sample  consists mainly  of large  plants, which 
is not surprising  because the LED documentation  explains that large 
plants owned by larger-than-average  firms  are disproportionately  rep- 
resented  in the file. Table  2 shows that  LED Time  Series  plants,  although 
comparatively  few, are ten or twelve times as large  in terms  of employ- 
ment and output, respectively, as the typical manufacturing  plant. Frank R. Licht  enberg  and Donald  Siegel  651 
Table 2.  Employment and Value of Shipments for LED Sample Plants and for Total 
Manufacturing Sector, 1977 
Total  Ratio 
Item  Sample  popiilation  (per-cent) 
Employment  (thousands)  10,275  18,515  55.5 
Plants (thousands)  20.5  350.7  5.9 
Shipments (billions of dollars)  909  1,359  66.9 
Shipments per plant  44.4  3.9  ... 
Employment  per plant  501.4  52.8  ... 
Souirce: Population values are derived from the U.S.  Bureau of the Census,  1977 Cetnsius of Manqftlcture,  Subject 
Statistics,  vol.  I (Government Printing Office,  1981), p.  1.7. 
Approximately  82  percent  of the time series plants  employed  at least 250 
workers,  28.8  percent  employed  between  250  and  499, and  52.7 had  more 
than  500. The corresponding  figures  for the population  of manufacturing 
plants  were 4 percent with at least 250 workers,  2.5 percent  with 250 to 
499 workers,  and 1.7 percent  with more  than  500. 
Another special characteristic  of the Time Series file is that only 
establishments  in continuous  operation  are observed; plants that close 
or fail are not included. In addition  to selling a plant or continuing  to 
operate  it, the owner  may, of course, choose to shut it down. Owners  of 
the  plants  in the  Time  Series  file  have not adopted  this option.  Therefore, 
transactions  involving these establishments are all successful in the 
sense that  changes  in ownership  did not lead to plant  closings. 
Plant  failures  are  common  among  U. S. manufacturing  plants.  Timothy 
Dunne, Mark  J. Roberts, and Larry  Samuelson  have reported  a failure 
rate between two consecutive quinquennial  Censuses of Manufactures 
of 30 percent  for the population  of manufacturing  plants;  56 percent of 
all plants sampled  in 1972  had ceased operations  by 1982.14  However, 
they emphasized  that failure rates are sharply  lower for larger, older 
establishments-exactly those that dominate  the Time Series file. They 
calculated  a failure  rate  of only 10  percent  for plants  with more  than  250 
employees  (82  percent  of our sample)  that  are at least twenty years old. 
Unfortunately,  population estimates of the percentage of plants that 
changed  owners before closure are unavailable.  Thus we are unable to 
determine  whether  new owners are especially likely to close plants. 
14. Timothy Dunne,  Mark J. Roberts,  and Larry Samuelson,  "The Impact of Plant 
Failure on Employment Growth in the U.S.  Manufacturing Sector,"  unpublished paper 
(Pennsylvania State University,  1987). 652  Br  ookings Paper s on  Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
Plant  openings  are also excluded  from  the sample.  Openings  perform 
an important  function in the evolution of many industries. Timothy 
Dunne and Mark  J. Roberts  have reported  that approximately  150,000 
plants were born  between 1972  and 1977  and  another  137,000  by 1982.  15 
Because of the structure  of the Time Series file, we did not observe 
ownership  changes  of these fledgling  plants. 
The ownership  changes  in this sample  may also be nonrepresentative 
from a time series perspective. Merger  activity increased  substantially 
in the 1960s,  peaking  near  the end of the decade; conglomerate  mergers 
were especially popular.  16 Based on data from W. T. Grimm,  David J. 
Ravenscraft  and F. M. Scherer  estimated  that 40 percent of corporate 
acquisitions  in the 1970s  were spin-offs  of previously acquired  units.17 
Using  the Federal  Trade  Commission's  line-of-business  data,  they  found 
that  70 percent  of all lines of business  that  were completely  sold off from 
1974  to 1981  had originally  been purchased  by their  parent  companies. 
Given the proximity of the time frame of our sample to the wave of 
conglomerate  mergers  in  the 1960s,  it is likely  that  the ownership  changes 
we observed reflect an unusually  high percentage  of spin-offs of units 
acquired  through  conglomerate  mergers. 
OWNERSHIP  CHANGE 
Plant  ownership  change is a key variable  in our analysis. Each plant 
is assigned  a two-digit  coverage code that identifies  establishments  that 
have experienced  a change  in operational  status  from  the previous  year. 
Several  values of the coverage code relate specifically  to plant  acquisi- 
tions by an ultimate  parent.  For example, if company  A owns a division 
with several  plants  and sells it to company  B, we assigned  each plant  in 
the division an acquisition-related  coverage code after the deal was 
consummated.  Sales of individual  plants  in a division  led to acquisition- 
related  coverage  codes only for those that  were actually  sold. 
15.  Timothy Dunne and Mark J. Roberts,  "Measuring Firm Entry, Growth, and Exit 
with Census of Manufactures Data,"  unpublished paper (Pennsylvania  State University, 
1986). 
16.  Devra  Golbe  and Lawrence  J.  White,  "Mergers  and Acquisitions  in the  U.S. 
Economy:  An Aggregate and Historical Overview,"  in Alan J. Auerbach,  ed.,  Mergers 
and  Acqusitions  (University  of  Chicago  Press  for  the  National  Bureau  of  Economic 
Research,  1988), pp. 25-48. 
17.  David J. Ravenscraft and F. M. Scherer, "Mergers and Managerial Peiformance," 
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Table  3. Annual  Changes  in Ownership  for 20,493  Manufacturing  Plants 
(Unweighted),  1972-81 
Plants  Plants 
changing  changing 
owners  owners 
Year  (percent)  Year  (percent) 
1972  3.0  1977  1.7 
1973  0.9a  1978  2.2 
1974  3.2  1979  2.4 
1975  2.7  1980  3.3 
1976  1.6  1981  4.1 
Source: Derived from LED sample. 
a.  Coverage codes have apparently  not been properly  assigned to plants in 1973: according  to data from W. T. Grinmm  and 
Co., Mergerstat  Review, 1985 (Chicago:  Grimm, 1986), 1973 was a year of moderate  selloff activity. Therefore  our analysis 
does not include ownership  changes occurring  in 1973. 
Each establishment  was also assigned an identification  number  con- 
taining  a unique  six-digit  code for its parent  company.  In principle,  these 
codes could  be used  to identify  new owners  (ultimate  parents).  However, 
changes in plant identification  numbers are a potentially misleading 
indicator  of ownership  change. According  to Timothy  Dunne  and Mark 
J. Roberts and the LED documentation,  plant identification  numbers 
were improperly  assigned  in 1972  and 1978.  Furthermore,  the numbers 
can change  for reasons unrelated  to mergers  and acquisitions, such as 
legal reorganization  or other changes in organizational  status.18  There- 
fore we defined changes in ownership  solely on the basis of coverage 
codes. 
From  1972  to 1981,  nearly  21  percent  of the 20,500  plants  in  the sample 
experienced  at least one ownership  change, a turnover  rate  that showed 
remarkably  little variation  among two-digit SICs. Except for tobacco 
and miscellaneous manufacturing  establishments, the percentage of 
plants  changing  owners ranged  only from 14.9 percent  to 23.8 percent. 
When  ownership  changes  were weighted  by plant  employment,  a proxy 
for plant  size, the average  turnover  rate was 15  percent, signifying  that 
smaller  establishments  are more  likely to be acquired  and sold. Table  3, 
showing  the  unweighted  annual  percentages  of plant  turnovers,  indicates 
that, except for 1973, acquisition activity among these large plants 
18. Dunne and Roberts,  "Measuring Firm Entry, Growth, and Exit."  For example, 
each  plant is  designated  as  single-unit  or multiunit,  depending  on  whether  its  owner 
operates one or more than one.  A change in a plant's status will result in a change in its 
identification number, although the plant may not have been involved  in an ownership 
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essentially mirrored  the patterns  of aggregate  merger  activity shown in 
table 1. Unfortunately,  data  on the incidence  of ownership  change  among 
the total population  of manufacturing  plants  are unavailable. 
INITIAL  PRODUCTIVITY 
Another  important  variable  in the matching  model  is initial  productiv- 
ity. We measured  the initial level of plant productivity  by estimating 
separately by four-digit  SIC industry  and year cross-sectional Cobb- 
Douglas  production  functions  of the following  form: 
In Qi =  to +  OLK ln Ki +  aL  In  Li  +  otM ln Mi  +  ui, 
where Q is output, K is stock of physical capital,  L is labor  input, M is 
intermediate  materials  input  (including  energy),  and  the subscript  i refers 
to plant  i. The construction  of the Q, K, L, and  M measures  is described 
in the appendix;  u is a classical  disturbance  term. Separate  estimation  of 
the equation  for individual  industries  and years allowed  the elasticities, 
cvi, to vary across industries and over time. We did not impose the 
assumptions  of competitive  factor  markets  or constant  returns  to scale. 
The residual  measures  the logarithmic  deviation  of a plant's  total factor 
productivity  from  the average  productivity  of plants  in its industry. 
TOTAL  FACTOR  PRODUCTIVITY  GROWTH 
To investigate the effects of ownership  change on efficiency at the 
plant  level, we examined  the  behavior  of total  factor  productivity  growth. 
Standard  growth accounting  methods using the full equilibrium  index 
model  were used to calculate  TFP growth.  19  Production  was assumed  to 
be characterized  by a three-factor  production  function: 
Q(t) = A(t)F[K(t), L(t), M(t)], 
where Q, K, L, and  M are  as previously  defined,  and  A is a Hicks-neutral 
measure  of technical  change. 
For simplicity, we assumed a Cobb-Douglas  production  function: 
Q(t)  =  A(t)  * 1-1-3  . X.(t)Pi 
19.  Michael Hazilla and Raymond J. Kopp, "The Measurement of Sectoral Productiv- 
ity: A Comparative Evaluation of Alternative  Approaches,"  unpublished paper (1987), 
used this terminology to describe the calculation of TFP based on the assumption that all 
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where  Xl(t) equals  K(t),  X2(t)  equals  L(t),  X3(t)  equals  M(t),  and Pi  equals 
the output  elasticity  of factor  i. An index of TFP is defined  as 
TFP(t) = A(t)  =  Q(t)/H3 I  Xi(t)i. 
Taking  the log of this equation  and  computing  time derivatives  yields 
TFP/TFP = A/A  =  Q/Q -  13=  Pi  (X,/XW), 
where d[log  TFP(t)]/dt =  TFP/TFP, d[log  Q(t)]ldt  =  Q/Q, and 
d[log Xi (t)]ldt = Xi/Xi.  As shown in the appendix,  the construction  of 
TFP  growth  is based on two standard  assumptions:  the output  elasticity 
of the ith input  is equal  to the share  of the ith input  in the total cost; and 
constant returns to scale,  or  =I  1. The first assumption follows 
from the first-order  conditions  for equilibrium  in factor markets.20  In a 
recent  study  using  a subset of the LED file, Frank  R. Lichtenberg  found 
evidence supporting  both of these assumptions.21 
Next, we evaluated a Tornqvist  index of real input. The Tornqvist 
index can be considered a discrete approximation  to the continuous 
Divisia  index of real  input. Our  explicit  formula  for TFP growth  was 
TFP/TFP  =  ln (Qt/Qt  - 6)  -  IL  I [0  5*(Sit  +  Si,t-6)]  In (XitlXit,_6), 
where Sit  is the share of factor i in the total cost of output at time t, 
factors i  =  K, L, and M (including  energy), and Xit is the quantity 
of factor i at time t in real terms. Comprehensive  information  on vari- 
able definitions, data sources, and methodology is contained in the 
appendix. 
Results 
One important  implication  of the model  just outlined is that plants 
with low productivity  due to a poor match are more likely to change 
owners than those with good matches. To test this hypothesis, we 
20.  An alternative to our full equilibrium index number model is the partial equilibrium 
index model described in Ernst R. Berndt and Melvyn A. Fuss, "Productivity Measurement 
with Adjustments for Variations in Capacity Utilization and Other Forms of Temporary 
Equilibrium," Jolurnal of Econometrics,  vol.  33 (Aninals, 1986), pp. 7-29.  In this model, 
capital is assumed to be quasi-fixed (out of equilibrium). Hazilla and Kopp, "Measurement 
of Sectoral Productivity,"  used both models to estimate industry productivity and found 
that the corresponding estimates were virtually identical. 
21.  Frank R. Lichtenberg,  "Using  Longitudinal Establishment  Data to Estimate the 
Internal Adjustment Costs Model," ReWiewi'  of Econiomics anid  Statistics  (forthcoming). 656  Br  ookings Paiper  s on  Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
estimated a probit regression model, OC7480 = f(RELTFP73,  EMP73), 
where OC7480  is a dummy  variable  denoting  whether a plant changed 
owners at least once from  1974  to 1980,  RELTFP73  is a plant's 1973  level 
of productivity  normalized  by industry,  and  EMP73  is the log of a plant's 
1973  level of employment  normalized  by industry.  The estimates of the 
probit  equation  presented  below (t-statistics  in parentheses)  were con- 
sistent with this hypothesis. There was a highly significant  inverse 
relationship  between  initial  productivity  and  subsequent  plant  turnover. 
Initial  Log plant  Log 
productivity  employment,  likelihood 
(residual)  1973  Constant  ratio  x  -2 
-0.321  -0.066  -  1.111  69.98 
(6.49)  (5.15)  (95.75) 
In principle  other variables, such as unionization  or the extent of 
certain types of fixed investment, may influence the probability of 
ownership  change, so it is desirable to include additional  covariates. 
David J. Ravenscraft  and F.  M. Scherer considered many possible 
determinants  of divisional  (line-of-business)  divestiture,  including  prof- 
itability  of the firm, strategic  variables  (line-of-business  market  share, 
research and development costs, and advertising  costs), and various 
dummy  variables  relating  to previous  merger  activity  within  each line of 
business. Such explanatory  variables  are excluded from  our ownership 
change equation  because they were unobserved  or because calculating 
them was not feasible. But Ravenscraft  and Scherer concluded that 
profitability  or performance  of the line of business is the most important 
determinant  of selling off a line of business.22  Similarly,  we find that 
productivity  plays a major  role in plant  divestiture.  Furthermore,  unless 
the omitted variables  are correlated  with the regressors in the probit 
equation,  our estimate  of the impact  of productivity  on the decision to 
sell is unbiased. 
Although  we believe that  low productivity  leads  to ownership  change, 
another,  perhaps  more  illuminating,  way to examine  this relationship  is 
to compute  the mean  values of RELTFP73  by values of OC7480  (that  is, 
separately  for plants  that change ownership  and those that do not) and 
to test the hypothesis  that the means are equal. Abram  Bergson used a 
22.  David J. Ravenscraft and F. M. Scherer, "Divisional  Sell-Off: A Hazard Function 
Analysis,"  unpublished paper (1987). Frank R. Lichtenberg  and Donald  Siegel  657 
Table 4.  Relationship between Manufacturing Plant Productivity in 1973 and Ownership 
Change in 1974-80 
Initial  Initial 
pr-oductivity  productivity 
Independent  var-iable  (residual)a  (residual)a 
One or more ownership  change  -.0324 
(6.42) 
One ownership change  . ..  -.0286 
(5.28) 
More than one ownership  change  .  .  .  -.0532 
(4.39) 
Log plant employment,  1973  .0050  .0050 
(2.63)  (2.62) 
Intercept  .0043  .0043 
(2.36)  (2.36) 
K2  1027.74  1027.54 
Residual degrees  of freedom  18,224  18,223 
Source:  Author's  calculations. 
a.  t-statistics  in parentheses. 
similar  methodology  to estimate  institutional  differences  in productivity 
between Communist  bloc and Western  mixed-economy  countries.23  To 
control for the effects of plant size, we included employment as an 
additional  regressor.24  The point estimates, shown in table 4, are inter- 
preted as measures of the mean percentage  difference  in productivity 
between  changers  and  nonchangers.  The 1973  productivity  of plants  that 
changed  owners between 1974  and 1980  was 3.2 percent  lower than  the 
productivity  of plants  that  did not. Establishments  that  were destined  to 
turn  over more than once between 1974  and 1980  exhibited especially 
inferior performances in 1973.25 
Although  the results of table 4 are instructive, they are based on a 
single cross-section, and the ownership-change  dummy variables are 
not year-specific.  For a more precise and comprehensive  examination 
23.  Abram Bergson,  "Comparative  Productivity:  The  USSR,  Eastern Europe,  and 
the West," American Economic Review,  vol. 77 (June 1987), pp. 342-57. 
24.  Because inefficient plants tend to have low rates of employment growth, controlling 
for employment  may  have  led  us  to  underestimate  the  effect  of  productivity  on  the 
probability of ownership change if all else is equal. 
25.  With respect to the second column of table 4, we can reject the hypothesis  that the 
point estimates  of  single  and  multiple  changers  are the  same  at a 5  percent  level  of 
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Table 5.  Differences in Mean Levels of Productivity between Plants Changing 
Ownership in Year t and Plants Not Changing Ownership 
Level of  Level of 
productivity  productivitv 
Year  (residual)a  Year  (residuaI)a 
t-7  -2.6  t+ 1  -2.9 
(4.00)  (6.06) 
t-6  --3.0  t+2  -2.7 
(5.06)  (6.00) 
t-5  -3.4  t+3  -2.5 
(6.50)  (4.97) 
t-4  -3.3  t+4  - 1.9 
(6.77)  (3.52) 
t-3  -3.3  t+5  -  1.9 
(7.40)  (3.23) 
t-2  -3.6  t+6  -  1.8 
(8.71)  (2.57) 
t-1  -3.7  t+7  -1.2 
(9.59)  (1.16) 
t  --3.9 
(9. 10) 
Sources: Authors' calculations. 
a.  t-statistics  to test Ho: difference equals 0 in parentheses. 
of the timing effects of ownership  change, we computed productivity 
residuals  based on Cobb-Douglas  production  functions, estimated  sep- 
arately  by industry,  using  annual  data  for 1973-80.  These residuals  were 
used to calculate  differences  in mean levels of productivity  in year t + i 
(i  =  7,  -  6,...  ,  6, 7) between  plants changing owners in year t and 
plants remaining with the same corporation.26  The pooled, within- 
industry  ordinary  least squares estimates of these differences  are pre- 
sented in table 5. Consider  the value - 3.7 in year t-  1. This number 
indicates that plants changing  owners in year t were 3.7 percent less 
productive  in year t -  1 than plants in the same industry  not changing 
owners in year t. The relative performance  of changers in year t was 
poorest at the end of the transition  year, the year of ownership  change 
(-3.9  percent). Successive  declines in the absolute values of  the 
differences indicate that relative levels  of  efficiency improve after 
ownership  changes. 
26. The  differences  are  estimates  of the parameter  3  in the  following  regression  model: 
Residual+,i =  ai +  fiOC, (i =  -  7,  -  6,...,6,  7), where OC, equals 1  if the plant changed 
owners  between  t -  1 and t and  0 otherwise,  and  the residuals  are computed  from  within- 
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The other major implication  of the matching theory is that plant 
turnover should result in improvements  in productivity. The values 
presented in table 5 suggest that productivity  growth is higher after 
plants  have been involved in takeovers.  Just  four years after  ownership 
has changed, approximately  49 percent of the productivity  gap that 
existed at t -  1  (-  3.7 percent)  between year  t changers  and  nonchangers 
was closed (-  1.9 percent). At t + 7, almost 68 percent of this gap was 
eliminated (-1.2  percent). Moreover, the difference in t + 7 is  not 
statistically  significant.  Thus  we cannot  reject  the hypothesis  that  plants 
that were sold seven years before are  just as productive  as plants that 
were not sold. 
To examine further  the effects of plant turnover  on economic effi- 
ciency, we computed  regressions of the growth in TFP between 1974 
and 1980  on various measures  of the incidence of ownership  change in 
those years. These results are reported  in table 6, which supports  the 
hypothesis that ownership change improves productivity. Plants in- 
volved in one or more transactions  during  this period  experienced  0.58 
percent higher TFP growth than their industry counterparts  who re- 
mained  with the same parent  corporation. 
If the new owners of plants  increase  the economic efficiency  of these 
establishments,  it seems likely that  several  years  must  elapse before  this 
improvement  is measurable. To test this assumption, we  classified 
ownership  changes  according  to whether  they occurred  early (1974-76) 
or  late  (1977-80)  in  the  period.  Plants  changing  hands  early  had  significant 
improvements  in efficiency;  those changing  toward  the end of the period 
did  not. Thus  it appears  that efficiency  gains associated  with ownership 
changes  do not occur immediately.  Productivity  increases  were slightly 
greater in plants that experienced more than one ownership change 
during  the period. 
Each  plant's  initial  productivity  is included  in table 6 as an additional 
regressor  to control  for the possibility  of a regression  toward  the mean. 
As discussed previously, the increases in productivity  that seem to be 
associated  with a change in ownership  may in fact reflect  the tendency 
of below-  or above-average  values to regress  toward  mean  values. 
Plants  that  changed  owners  thus  had  lower  initial  levels of productivity 
and greater  growth  in productivity  than plants that did not. Consistent 
with  a matching  hypothesis  of plant  turnover,  we interpret  the low initial 
level to be due to inefficient  management  (perhaps  because of random 
mismatch)  and  the higher  growth  to be due on average  to more efficient *  *  *  o  o  o  >~~C  I-  m  m  CD  r-  (= 
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management.  There  are, however, at least two other  potential  explana- 
tions for the finding  that  plants  with low initial  productivity  have higher 
subsequent  productivity  growth. 
The first is the regression-to-the-mean  hypothesis. Suppose that for 
behavioral  reasons a plant's productivity  growth  is inversely related  to 
its initial  level, so that 
TFP  -  TFP-  3TFPI  +E 
where  E is a random  disturbance.  The equation  may be rewritten  as 
TFP  (1 + r3)TFP-I  + E =  aTFP-I +  , 
where  a equals 1 +  3.  The hypothesis  is that P < 0, or that  a < 1. Plants 
beneath  the frontier  have opportunities  to catch up that are unavailable 
to "best practice"  plants  near  the frontier;  that is, maybe  all plants  that 
exhibit substandard  levels of performance  at the beginning  of a period 
catch up, with or without  changing  owners. 
The second potential  explanation  makes a weaker  assumption  about 
the evolution  of TFP, but is based on the fact that  plants  that  close were 
not included  in our sample. Suppose TFP  follows a random  walk, that 
is, TFP -  TFP_  I +  E, so that  (in the notation  of the previous  paragraph) 
a =  1. Also assume that  if a plant's  relative  productivity  declines below 
a certain  threshold,  it will close. Consider  the plants that experience a 
given decline in productivity  from one year to the next. The higher  its 
initial  productivity,  the less likely the plant  is to cross the threshold  and 
therefore  to close. Plants  with  low initial  levels of productivity  are more 
likely to be absent from the sample  than plants with high initial  levels. 
Even if productivity  follows a random  walk, censoring could account 
for the fact that plants with low initial  productivity  levels have higher 
average  productivity  growth.  Regression  toward  the mean  could  account 
for this  fact even in the absence of censoring. 
Neither  of these mechanisms,  however, could account  for the entire 
set of coefficients  presented  in table  5. In particular,  they cannot  explain 
why the relative productivity  of plants that change owners does not 
rise-and  indeed falls-between  t -  7 and t, and rises only after t. Both 
the  explanations  sketched  above would  predict  that  relative  productivity 
would increase  beginning  in t - 7. The fact that productivity  begins to 
rise only after  the ownership  change occurs strongly  suggests that it is 
the change  in ownership  that  is largely  responsible  for the improvement. 
When initial productivity is  included in the regression model, the 662  Brookings Paper-s on Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
estimated coefficients decline, but only slightly. Thus even after con- 
trolling  for a possible regression-to-the-mean  effect, we still found that 
ownership  change  led to improvements  in economic efficiency. 
Finally,  initial  productivity  may  also  have  been  mismeasured,  perhaps 
because of errors in the industry  deflators  used to calculate constant 
dollar values of output, capital, materials, and energy. Measurement 
error  is also associated  with the calculation  of levels of TFP. However, 
in constructing  estimates  of TFP  growth,  we assumed  that  this measure- 
ment  error  was permanent.27  Thus  the true  model  we attempt  to estimate 
in column 4 of table 6 is of the form  y =  3IX,  +  32X2  +  ti, where y is 
TFP growth,  XI is an ownership  change  dummy  variable  (subsequent), 
X2 is "true" initial  productivity,  and u is a classical disturbance  term. 
We do not observe X2, but rather an imperfect measure of initial 
productivity,  Z2  =  X2 +  E, where E is a classical disturbance  term. In 
addition,  E (measurement  error)  is assumed to be uncorrelated  with u, 
XI, and y. Zvi Griliches  demonstrated  that in the case of a regression 
model with two independent  variables where only one is subject to 
measurement  error,  the bias in the point estimate of the variable  that is 
measured  incorrectly  is transmitted  to the other coefficient.  He derived 
the following  formula  for the bias in PI: plim(@P  -  PI) =  -  p (bias P2), 
where p is the correlation  coefficient between XI and Z2.28  We have 
already  presented  evidence  suggesting  that  an  inverse  relationship  exists 
between initial  productivity  and subsequent  ownership  change (p < 0). 
Furthermore,  it is well known that the ordinary  least squares (OLS) 
estimate  of 12  is biased  toward  zero.29  Thus the bias in 32  iS transmitted 
to 1I, and we expect the OLS estimate of PI  also to be biased toward 
zero. An instrumental  variables  (IV)  estimator  was used to adjust  for the 
bias inherent  in OLS estimation  of the models in columns  4, 5, and 6 of 
table 6. We experimented  with many possible instruments  for initial 
productivity, settling on productivity in 1973 (t -7)  as the best in- 
strument. As expected, the point estimates of the ownership-change 
27. TFP,  =  TFP* +  i,,  and TFP, 6 = TFP* 6 +  q,-6,  where  the asterisk  denotes the 
true  unobserved  level of TFP and q,,  ?-6  are classical  disturbance  terms:  ATFP =  TFP, 
-  TFP,t6  =  TFP,* -  TFP,*  6 +  t -  mr-6  =  ZATFP*  +  t -  '1t-6.  If we assume  that q, = 
r,-6  (permanent  measurement  error),  then  ATFP  = ATFP*. 
28. Zvi Griliches,  "Economic  Data Issues," in Zvi Griliches  and Michael  D. Intrili- 
gator,  eds., Handbook  of Econometrics,  vol. 3 (North-Holland,  1986),  pp. 1466-1514. 
29. This  follows  from  the classical  error-in-variables  model. Frank R. Lichtenberg  and Donald  Siegel  663 
dummies increased slightly, and their standard  errors declined under 
two-stage least-squares estimation in columns 7, 8, and 9. Thus the 
efficiency-gain  hypothesis associated with a matching  theory of plant 
turnover  was confirmed,  even after  adjusting  for measurement  error  and 
a regression-to-the-mean  effect. 
The data are, then, consistent with the two key implications  of the 
matching  theory of ownership  change-that  the least productive  plants 
are most likely to change  owners and  that  ownership  change  tends to be 
associated with above-average increases in productivity. Computing 
differences  in mean  growth  rates of outputs, inputs, and  productivity  in 
year t+ i (i =  -  7,  -  6,  . . .,  6, 7) between  plants changing owners  in 
year t and plants not changing owners in year t provides additional 
insight  into this phenomnenon.  As before, all data are standardized  by 
four-digit  SIC industry, so these differences should be interpreted  as 
pooled,  within-industry  differences  .30 The  differences  and  the associated 
t-statistics  (for testing Ho:  difference = 0) are presented  in table 7. To 
clarify  the interpretation  of these nuumbers,  consider the value -  1.1 in 
the fifth  row (i =  - 3) under  "output."  This  value signifies  that  the mean 
rate  of output  growth  in year t-  3 of firms  that  changed  owners in year t 
was 1.1 percent  lower than  the corresponding  mean output  growth  rate 
of year t nonchangers.  In the "output"  column  the difference  in growth 
rates  is negative  and  generally  increasing  in magnitude  from  t - 4 through 
t, the year of ownership  change, and is positive in years t + 1 and t + 3. 
All these differences  are statistically  significant.  The mean growth  rate 
of output  of year t changers  was lower in every year  before  t except t - 5 
and t -7  (the average  between  t -3  and t -  1 was  -  1.8 percent),  and 
higher  in  every year  between  t + 1  and  t + 3 (the  average  difference  during 
this period was 1.4 percent). These differences show that change in 
ownership  arrests and to some extent reverses the decline of a plant. 
Because the differences  in output  growth  rates after ownership  change 
are smaller  than  the differences  before acquisition,  the year t changers 
experienced  a shrinking  market  share  between years t - 3 and t + 3. 
Consider  next the differences in labor input  growth  rates. With one 
30. The differences  are the parameter  estimates  of 3 derived  from  regressions  of the 
following form: In (X?,  j/X,,i  l) =  oxi  +  iOC,  (i  =  -7,  -6,  . . .,  6, 7). where  OC, 
equals 1 if the plant  changed  owners  between t -  1 and t and  0 otherwise.  X refers  to the 
specific  variables  considered  in table 7. All of these growth  rates were standardized  by 
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Table 7.  Differences in Mean Growth Rates of Output, Inputs, and Productivity 
between Plants Changing Owners in Year t and Those Not Changing Ownersa 
Percent 
Year  Output  Labor  Materials  Capital  TFP 
t-7  0.4  0.2  -0.9  -0.1  1.0 
(0.43)  (0.32)  (0.39)  (0.13)  (1.02) 
t-6  -0.3  -0.2  -0.8  -0.5  -0.2 
(0.45)  (0.28)  (0.88)  (1.14)  (0.02) 
t -  5  0.0  1.0  0.5  0.0  0.3 
(0.03)  (1.96)  (0.69)  (0.13)  (0.29) 
t-4  -  1.2  -0.5  -  1.0  0.0  0.9 
(2.09)  (0.96)  (1.59)  (0.18)  (0.95) 
t-3  -  1.1  -0.4  -2.0  -0.5  0.7 
(2.06)  (0.78)  (2.77)  (1.71)  (0.73) 
t -  2  -  2.0  -  0.8  -  3.0  -  0.7  0.7 
(4.03)  (2.01)  (5.03)  (2.79)  (0.71) 
t-  1  -2.4  -2.2  -3.3  -0.9  1.8 
(5.09)  (5.56)  (5.86)  (4.05)  (2.17) 
t  -4.8  -4.1  -5.0  -0.6  1.6 
(9.42)  (10.65)  (8.15)  (2.90)  (2.01) 
t+  1  1.3  0.4  0.1  1.0  3.4 
(2.49)  (1.00)  (0.16)  (4.51)  (2.78) 
t + 2  1.5  1.0  0.8  0.2  0.3 
(2.81)  (2.26)  (1.26)  (0.79)  (0.42) 
t+3  1.3  0.6  1.4  0.6  -  1.1 
(1.95)  (1.31)  (1.93)  (2.58)  (0.87) 
t+4  0.8  -0.1  0.1  0.4  0.3 
(1.29)  (0.12)  (0.20)  (1.52)  (0.42) 
t + 5  0.4  0.5  0.2  0.2  -  0.2 
(0.58)  (0.93)  (0.20)  (0.65)  (0.13) 
t+6  -0.6  -0.2  -  1.0  0.2  -2.8 
(0.74)  (0.37)  (1.10)  (0.70)  (1.39) 
t+7  -0.4  -0.4  -0.3  0.4  1.4 
(0.41)  (0.62)  (0.23)  (1.02)  (0.42) 
Mean 
t-3  to t-  1  -  1.8  -  1.1  -2.8  -0.7  1.1 
t+  I to t+3  1.4  0.7  0.8  0.6  0.9 
Sources:  Authors'  calculations. 
a.  t-statistics  to test  Ho: difference equals 0 in parentheses. 
important  exception, the pattern  is similar  to the case of output:  from 
t-  3 through  t, the differences  are negative and growing. Labor input 
begins to be higher  for year t changers  in t + 1, although  the increases 
are smaller  than  they were for output  growth.  Still, the absence of lower 
growth  rates after  ownership  changes is inconsistent  with the view that 
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Summers  suggest  that  a firm's  long-term  implicit  contracts  with  workers 
and suppliers are breached in the course of a hostile takeover. Our 
analysis indicates that changes in ownership are more likely to stem 
employment reductions  than trigger  mass layoffs.3"  The statistics for 
materials  tell a similar  story: dramatically  slower growth in materials 
used and in capital before and during  the ownership change, slightly 
higher  growth  afterward. 
The differences  in annual  total factor productivity  growth rates are 
inconsistent  with  the results  reported  earlier  and  with input  and  outputs. 
Plants  that were sold had significantly  higher  TFP growth  in years t -  1 
through  t  + 1. We believe these results are implausible,  because TFP 
growth is calculated  as output growth minus a Divisia index of input 
growth, using plant-specific  factor shares as weights. Short-term  fluc- 
tuations in plant activities are such that factor shares and thus TFP 
growth  rates  are computed  imprecisely. 
Conclusions 
Twenty-one  percent  of the plants  in the sample,  which  are  larger  than 
average  manufacturing  establishments,  experienced  at least one change 
in corporate  control  between 1972  and 1981.  Evidence pertaining  to the 
determinants  and effects of these transfers  is consistent with the empir- 
ical implications  of a matching  theory of plant  turnover.  That is, a firm 
lacking  a comparative  advantage  with respect to a given plant  will sell it 
to another  corporation,  leading on average to an improvement  in the 
plant's  economic  performance. 
Our analysis of the factors influencing  divestitures  of plants found 
that  low levels of efficiency  increase  the likelihood  of ownership  change. 
A probit  regression  of subsequent  turnover  on initial  productivity  and 
size revealed  that industry  laggards  in 1973  were more likely to be sold 
in the following  six years than  plants  that were efficient.  The suitability 
of matches  between  plants  and  firms  thus seems rationally  evaluated  by 
their owners. Low levels of productivity  indicate that a plant and its 
owner  are  not suited  for  each other,  and  a termination  of this relationship 
is imminent. 
31. Shleifer  and  Summers,  "Hostile  Takeovers  as Breaches  of Trust."  The  abrogation 
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In  the  previous  section, we presented  prima  facie  evidence  of improve- 
ment  in the efficiency  of manufacturing  plants  after  changes  in corporate 
ownership. In our framework,  efficiency gains were defined as higher 
rates of TFP growth, or larger shifts in the production frontiers of 
establishments  changing  owners. Plants  involved in ownership  changes 
experienced, on average, 0.5 percent higher  TFP growth  between 1974 
and 1980,  a result driven  by the 0.8 percent  increase realized  by plants 
changing hands during the first three years in the six-year period. 
Apparently,  it takes several years for a new parent  to have a significant 
influence  on performance. 
Results concerning  differences  in levels of productivity  between sold 
and  unsold  plants  (table  5) provide  the most powerful  evidence support- 
ing  the hypothesis  of increased  efficiency. Sold  plants  exhibit  both  lower 
initial  levels of productivity  and a deterioration  in relative  performance 
through  the year in which these acquisitions  occur. But after changing 
owners, their  improvement  in  performance  reduces  and  eventually  (after 
seven years)  almost  eliminates  the productivity  gap  that  existed between 
them and the control group before takeover. Truncation  or censoring 
caused by our failure  to observe plants  that close cannot explain these 
patterns  of relative performance,  but it would be desirable  to confirm 
this claim by analyzing uncensored data. This is a task for future 
research.32 
The years covered in our analysis may explain  the divergence  of the 
findings  from those of Ravenscraft  and Scherer, who contended that 
mergers  are bad for the economy.33  Using the Federal  Trade  Commis- 
sion's line-of-business  data, they concluded that lines of business ac- 
quired during  the 1960s  and early 1970s were highly profitable  before 
mergers  but experienced declining  profitability  afterward.  Given that 
the line-of-business  sample  consists mainly  of large, diversified  corpo- 
rations (approximately  470 firms), many of these transactions were 
32. Addressing  another  aspect of sample selection bias, we contend that the over- 
representation  of large  plants  in  this  sample  may  cause  us to  underestimate  the  improvement 
in performance  associated with ownership  change. While combinations  of small plants 
and  large  firms  are  rarely  challenged  on  efficiency  grounds,  the  possibility  that  combinations 
of large  plants  and  large  firms  lead  to productivity  gains  is regarded  with  greater  skepticism. 
Transactions  of this type are  prominent  in the sample. 
33. David  J. Ravenscraft  and F. M. Scherer,  "The Profitability  of Mergers,"  unpub- 
lished paper (1986); and Ravenscraft  and Scherer, "Mergers  and Managerial  Peifor- 
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conglomerate  mergers  and acquisitions.  In a  subsequent  paper they 
observed  that heightened  merger activity  in the  1960s led to massive 
divestitures in the 1970s, divestitures that were precipitated by steadily 
deteriorating profits.34  Observing 282 lines of business  before and after 
divestiture (line-of-business  data are available for 1974-77),  they con- 
cluded that these units earned higher profits after joining new corpora- 
tions but that performance did not improve enough to allow them to earn 
normal rates of return. The results of that paper are generally consistent 
with our findings. However,  Ravenscraft and Scherer would argue that 
changes  in ownership  in the  1970s generally yielded  improvements  in 
efficiency because  most of the transactions involved  spin-offs of previ- 
ously acquired and unrelated lines of business.  According to this view a 
wave  of  unwarranted acquisitions  in the  1960s led  to  disappointing 
performance  and  large  numbers  of  sell-offs  in  the  1970s.  We  hope 
eventually  to extend  our sample through 1985; this would allow us to 
assess  the impact of transactions occurring during the next lively phase 
of mergers and acquisitions activity. 
Still, our findings concerning  the determinants and effects  of plant 
turnover imply that ownership change plays an important role in redeem- 
ing inefficient plants.  In Exit,  Voice,  and Loyalty,  Albert Hirschman 
argued that some agents in an economic  system may experience  lapses 
from efficient or rational behavior.  If the system  functions  smoothly, 
forces exist that will rectify this inefficient activity: 
No matter  how well a society's basic institutions  are devised, failures  of some 
actors  to live up to the behavior  which is expected of them are bound  to occur, 
if only for all kinds of accidental  reasons. Each society learns to live with a 
certain  amount  of such dysfunctional  or misbehavior;  but lest the misbehavior 
feed on itself and lead to general  decay, society must be able to marshal  from 
within  itself forces which will make as many of the faltering  actors as possible 
revert  to the behavior  required  for its proper  functioning.35 
Our evidence is consistent with the view that ownership change or asset 
redeployment  is  an important mechanism  for correcting  lapses  from 
inefficient producer behavior.  The  gains  realized  by  both  target and 
acquiring shareholders  appear to  be  social  gains,  not merely  private 
ones.  We found no evidence  that ownership change is usually accom- 
panied by the abrogation of implicit contracts with workers or suppliers. 
34. Ravenscraft  and  Scherer,  "Divisional  Sell-Off." 
35.  Albert 0.  Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses  to Declines  in Firms, 
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The often-cited  productivity  slowdown in the 1970s  was reflected  in 
our sample. The average  TFP growth  for all plants in the sample  from 
1974  to 1980  was -0.3  percent. Our evidence strongly suggested that 
this deterioration  would have been more pronounced if ownership 
changes  had  not  transpired.  These  results  imply  that  policymakers  should 
be  extremely cautious when considering policies that would make 
ownership  change  more  difficult  or costly. 
Our future work on this topic will attempt to study the nature of 
ownership  changes  that  occur  when  plants  are  sold. For  each  transaction, 
we can identify  the old and new parent  companies. The LED file also 
contains  information  on each firm's  operations  in different  industries  in 
a given year. This information  and  the panel  structure  of the data  will be 
used  to identify  different  types  of mergers,  acquisitions,  and  divestitures. 
Economists  and  government  officials  are especially concerned  with the 
effects of specific  kinds  of ownership  change  on efficiency. Analysis of 
distributions  of efficiency  gains  by different  methods  of classifying  such 
changes should broaden  our understanding  of mergers.  In this regard, 
we will determine  whether  our findings  are actually  masking  important 
differences  in the pre- and postmerger  performance  of plants involved 
in the following  types of transactions: 
First  and  subsequent  ownership  change. Ownership  change  can be 
classified  by whether  it is the first, second, or so on transaction  experi- 
enced by a given plant. Ravenscraft  and Scherer's research  suggested 
that, at least during  the early 1970s, second ownership changes may 
have led to greater  improvements  in productivity  than  initial  changes. If 
a firm  acquires  another  entire  firm,  for example, it often purchases  both 
desired and undesired  lines of business. Therefore, spin-offs of previ- 
ously acquired  units may result in efficiency gains while the original 
acquisition  may not. 
Full and partial  acquisitions. Whether  an ownership  change was 
part  of a complete  or  partial  corporate  acquisition  can  also  be determined. 
One might expect restructuring  to lead to greater improvements in 
efficiency  than  acquisitions  of entire  firms. 
Horizontal  and nonhorizontal  mergers.  We can identify  whether  a 
firm  purchasing  a plant  is entering  a new industry  or merely  augmenting 
its industrywide  activities. Because of their expertise in given lines of 
business, firms engaging  in horizontal  mergers may experience larger 
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-Friendly  and  hostile  takeovers.  It  may  also be possible  to distinguish 
between friendly and hostile ownership changes. Policymakers are 
especially concerned about the economic effects of hostile takeovers. 
Opponents  of these battles  for corporate  control  view them  as unneces- 
sary, extravagant  struggles  that yield no social benefits.  Further  exami- 
nation  of Shleifer  and Summers's  hypothesis  that  hostile takeovers  lead 
to breaches of implicit contracts with workers and suppliers will be 
pursued. 
We have attributed  the improvement  in economic  performance  when 
plants  change  owners to an improved  match  between owner and estab- 
lishment. In general, we believe these productivity  gains result from 
more  efficient  management.  However, we could not isolate the specific 
characteristics  of new management,  such as new technology or more 
effective leadership,  that are directly  responsible.  Certainly  a thorough 
analysis  of management's  contribution  to better  matches  is vital. 
From  an analysis of case studies, Ravenscraft  and Scherer  reported 
that simplification  of ownership  structure  improved  the performance  of 
lines of business.36  When  lines were acquired  through  horizontal  merger 
or were taken  private  by leveraged  buyouts(or  spin-offs),  they generally 
experienced  improved  profitability.  The authors  attributed  these results 
to reductions  in company  bureaucracy,  renewed  focus on more  efficient 
operations,  and other  positive developments  associated with their met- 
amorphosis  into independent  entities. We can determine  the effects on 
productivity  of simpler  ownership  structure  by using  the Census Bureau 
data. The LED file indicates  whether  an owner also owns other plants. 
We can therefore  determine  when a multiunit  establishment  becomes a 
single-unit  establishment.  Leveraged  buyouts  of entire  divisions can be 
determined  from external data sources, and the effects on individual 
manufacturing  plants  within  these divisions  can be observed. 
Finally,  in future  analyses of the determinants  of ownership  change, 
hazard  function  models  with covariates  will be devised and  estimated  to 
use the richness  of our panel data. In our framework  a hazard  function 
will measure  the probability  that divestiture  occurs within  a predictable 
interval,  given  that  a plant  has  remained  with  the same  parent  corporation 
until the beginning  of the interval. Although  our paramount  objective 
will be to estimate  the regression  parameters,  we are also interested  in 
36. Ravenscraft  and  Scherer,  "Mergers  and  Managerial  Performance." 670  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1987 
the properties  of the hazard  function.  That  is, we can determine  whether 
the conditional  probability  of divestiture  is strictly  increasing,  constant, 
or strictly  decreasing  as time goes on. 
Appendix 
To construct  estimates  of total  factor  productivity  growth  at the plant 
level based on three factors of production,  there must be estimates of 
real  values  of output,  Q;  capital,  K;  labor,  L; materials,  including  energy, 
M; and factor shares. The LED file provides  data on nominal  values of 
output, VQ; capital, VK; labor, VL; materials, VM; and changes in 
inventories.  The construction  of real Q, K, L, and  M requires  deflators. 
These deflators  were  imported  from  three  separate  files. In  this  appendix, 
we document the sources of our data and the methodology used to 
calculate  TFP growth. 
SOURCES 
Data  used  to construct  TFP  growth  were  imported  from  four  computer 
files: 
-The  Longitudinal  Establishment  Data Time Series file contains 
current  dollar  figures  on shipments,  labor,  materials  (including  energy), 
plant, equipment,  and inventories  for 20,493 establishments  that were 
sampled  continuously  in the Annual  Survey  of Manufactures  for 1972  to 
1981.  Each  plant  is assigned  to a firm  and  to a four-digit  SIC industry. 
-The  Bureau of Industrial  Economics Output data base contains 
deflators  for raw  materials,  work  in process, finished  goods inventories, 
and shipments  at the four-digit  SIC level for 1972-80. All deflators  are 
normalized  to 1  in 1972. 
-The  Bureau of Industrial  Economics Capital Stocks data base 
includes  data  at the three-  or four-digit  SIC level for 1972-81  on the net 
stock of capital in constant 1972  dollars;  the gross stock of capital in 
historical  dollars;  total capital  expenditures  and the fraction  devoted to 
replacement  investment;  and  investment  deflators.  These data  were  used 
to construct  plant-level,  time-series  estimates  of the net stock of capital. 
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project  file provides  materials  and  energy  deflators  at the four-digit  SIC 
level. 
METHODOLOGY 
With current dollar values of output and inputs, and deflators for 
1972-80  at the three-  or  four-digit  SIC  level, we have defined  our  nominal 
and  real  variables  in the following  manner. 
Output  in current  dollars is defined  as the value of shipments, TVS, 
with adjustments  for the net annual  change  in finished  goods, FGI, and 
work-in-process,  WIPI,  inventories: 
VQ=  TVS +  (endFGI  -  begFGI)  +  (endWIPI -  begWIPI), 
where  a V  appearing  before  Q, K, L, or  M refers  to a nominal  value. Real 
output  is computed  by dividing  each term on the right-hand  side of the 
equation  by its corresponding  industry  price  deflator,  D: 
Q = DTVS  +  (DendFGI  -  DbegFGI)  +  (DendWIPI  -  DbegWIPI). 
Labor  input  in current  dollars  is measured  as the sum of salaries  and 
wages,  SW, and total supplemental  labor costs,  TSLC: VL =  SW  + 
TSLC.  Real  labor  input  is defined  as the ratio  of total salaries  and  wages, 
TSW,  to production  worker  wages, PWW,  multiplied  by total  production 
worker hours, PWH: L  =  (TSW/PWW) x  PWH.  Thus labor deflators 
are not required,  and both nominal  and real labor inputs can be con- 
structed  completely  from  LED file variables. 
Nominal capital is constructed  assuming  constant returns  to scale. 
Current  dollar capital is defined as current dollar output minus the 
current  dollar  costs of materials  including  energy, CM, and labor, plus 
an adjustment  for the net change  in materials  inventories,  MATI: 
VK=  VQ  -  [CM  -  (endMATI  -  begMATJ)]  -  VL. 
We constructed  plant-level,  time series estimates of the net stock of 
plant  and equipment  in constant dollars  by combining  plant-level  data 
on the book value of capital  and on nominal  capital expenditures  with 
industry-level  data taken from the Bureau of Industrial  Economics 
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Values of Kij,,  were generated  by the following algorithm.  First, we 
computed  a benchmark  1972  estimate  of a plant's  net stock of capital, 
J,72 =GBVi,J,72  X NSTKCNj,721GSTKHISj,72, 
where GBViJ72 is the gross book value of the plant's assets in 1972, 
NSTKCONj,72  is the net stock in constant dollars  of industry  j's assets 
in 1972,  and  GSTKHISj 72  is the gross stock in current  dollars  of industry 
j's assets in 1972.  GBV  is the only measure  of assets in the LED file, but 
this is a gross capital,  current  dollar  measure,  and  we wished to obtain  a 
net capital,  constant  dollar  measure. 
Values of Ki,X  ,(t =  1973, . . . , 1981) were generated by the recursive 
perpetual  inventory  formula: 
Kij,t =  Kij,t_  I X (1-DEPRECjt)  +  (CAPEXPij,t1IDEFj,t), 
whereDEPRECj, is an  estimate  of the  average  rate  of capital  depreciation 
in industryj in year t, computed  as the ratio  of replacement  investment 
in industryj  in year t to the net stock of capital  in industryj  at the end of 
year t -  1, both in current  dollars;  CAPEXPiJ, is capital  expenditures  of 
plant i in industry  j  in year t; and IDEFj,t is the capital expenditure 
deflator  for industry]  in year  t. Since values  of all  the necessary  variables 
were available  separately  for plant  and equipment,  this procedure  was 
performed  separately  on each category of assets. The resulting  series 
were then added  together. 
Current  dollar values of materials,  including  energy, are defined  as 
cost of materials  taken  from  the LED file plus an adjustment  for the net 
change in materials inventories:  VM =  CM -  (endMATI -  begMATI). 
Constant  dollar  values of materials  were evaluated  by dividing  current 
dollar  values by the NBER four-digit  SIC price deflators  for materials 
and  energy:  m =  VMIPM. We also computed  factor  shares, which  were 
used in constructing  TFP: 
SM =  VM/VQ; SL =  VL/VQ; and  SK  =  VK/VA. 
Using the  methodology employed in  Zvi  Griliches and Frank R. 
Lichtenberg37  and in many other studies, we calculated a Tornqvist 
index of three  inputs: 
37.  Zvi Griliches and Frank R. Lichtenberg,  "R&D and Productivity Growth at the 
Industry Level:  Is There Still a Relationship'?" in Zvi Griliches, ed., R&D, Patenlts, anld 
Productivity  (University  of Chicago Press for National  Bureau of Economic  Research, 
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In (INt)  0.5 (SLt + SLt_6)  X In  i  L 
+  0.5  (SK,  +  SKt6)  x  In (Kt) 
+  0.5  (SMt  +  SMt_6)  x  In (MI ) 
1 [O.5*(Sit +  Si,-6)]  In 
where  IN, is the index of total input  at time t, Sit  is the share  of factor  i in 
the total cost of output at time t, factors i  =  K, L, M, and Xit is the 
quantity  of factor  i at time t in real  terms. Comments 
and Discussion 
Dale Jorgenson: I would like to begin by expressing  my admiration  of 
the authors. The Longitudinal  Establishment  Data (LED) set will ulti- 
mately transform  research  on productivity,  especially at the microeco- 
nomic level, and not only there. It will take many person-decades  of 
work before  these data  have been exhaustively  explored. 
Fortunately, we  have the benefit of  ten years' experience with 
somewhat  less rich  data  sets for regulated  industries.  Not until  recently, 
however, have methods  and modeling  techniques  been developed that 
can deal with the complexities that arise with a sample of hundreds  of 
firms, like those in such regulated  industries  as electric generating  or 
transportation  or communications.  But because the LED are an order 
of magnitude  more complex, it would be inappropriate  to have exces- 
sively sanguine  expectations  about when there will be any major  reve- 
lations based on them. Still, the authors have made an admirable 
beginning. 
Mergers and acquisitions have a cycle somewhat longer than the 
business cycle, but nonetheless there is a clear cycle. At the moment  it 
has probably  reached a peak. Maybe there will be fewer mergers  and 
acquisitions, but certainly  the last four or five years have witnessed a 
tremendous  amount  of activity. Table 1 in the paper  shows a clear surge 
that began  in 1981  and seems to have reached  a frenzy in 1986.  I do not 
know what the near future will bring, but activity will fall somewhat. 
Unfortunately  1981  is the last year for which the authors  have data, so 
we will have to wait until the additional  years have been added to the 
data set to examine  this surge  in activity. 
Neoclassical  economics  has  always  had  difficulty  coping  with  mergers 
and acquisitions.  First of all, if one takes the most naive view, they are 
uninteresting  because they occur for reasons that economists do not 
need  to investigate.  A more  sophisticated  view would  be that  differences 
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in information  obtain  for different  participants.  Finally,  one can analyze 
the activity in theoretical  terms, without  looking  at it empirically  at all. 
Obviously, people who have the more sanguine view of a particular 
economic enterprise-a firm,  a plant, or whatever-will  be able to pay 
more for it. They will bid it away from the people who have the less 
sanguine  expectations,  and  they are not always going  to be wrong. 
By and large, such activities should result in improved economic 
performance.  But in the literature  on mergers  and acquisitions,  that is 
not the only result. There  are in fact two kinds of results. Some studies 
make it obvious that people will take over or purchase  a plant and will 
benefit  from  this ownership  change. Other  studies show something  else 
going  on, activities  in which stockholders  or others  lose or people make 
mistakes. This paper is, obviously, in the former category, analyzing 
ownership  changes  that  improve  economic  performance.  The  theoretical 
position  of the authors  might  better  be represented  by a medical  analogy 
than a labor market  analogy. Plants, they argue, are like patients who 
get sick. Their  performance  deteriorates  and they look for a physician. 
Some  physicians  (managers)  are  available  within  the firm  itself, and  they 
can be sent to deal with the problems;  but they do not always succeed 
and may have to refer  the patient  to another  manager.  Plants  thus keep 
looking  until  they find  somebody  who can make  them well. Or  they die. 
But as the authors  note, the plants  that did not survive  are not included 
in the sample.  So we only have those that  got well. 
The idea that a plant's deteriorating  economic performance  can be 
followed by a change of regime and an improvement in economic 
performance  is well substantiated  in the paper.  It is an inspiring  example 
of what one can get from the Longitudinal  Establishment  Data set, and 
the authors  are to be complimented  in their choice of an appropriate 
level of econometric  sophistication. 
The best results in the paper  come from the simple exhibition  of the 
data.  Table  2, for example, underscores  the point  that  the LED exclude 
small  plants, which are more labor-intensive,  and new plants and plant 
closings. This constitutes  an important  handicap  but one that  cannot  be 
dealt  with  very effectively here. 
Table 3 suggests that more ownership  changes are associated with 
small  plants,  a suggestion  that  encourages  speculation,  but  nothing  more, 
about  what  would  have happened  if the study  had  been done for some of 
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the first  priority  is to find  some way of dealing  with this sample  selection 
problem. Another conclusion I would draw from table 3 is that the 
assumption of  constant returns to  scale,  which is  made in all the 
productivity  studies,  is absolutely  critical.  The  authors  explicitly  indicate 
that there is  some support for the assumption, but it needs more 
corroborative  testing to give it the backing necessary to substantiate 
their  results. 
The authors  also show that ownership  change has increased  from 3 
percent of plants in 1974  to 4 percent in 1981. Among the plants that 
changed  ownership,  more than  half experienced  more  than one change 
between 1974  and 1980  (table  4). Here  the medical  analogy  breaks  down; 
many plants do not get well. Of all these sick patients, many first 
consulted  a physician,  found  him unable  to cure them, and went on to a 
second one. 
Table 5 shows that the plants  that changed  ownership  are associated 
with  low initial  productivity,  small  size, or  low initial  employment.  Table 
6, which begins to present the authors' results, shows that more than 
one ownership  change  is associated  with higher  initial  productivity  than 
is a single ownership  change. In other words, the plants that changed 
hands more than once were, in some sense, healthier  to begin with. 
Now, a footnote indicates that this difference  is not significant,  but it 
does deserve fuller  exploration. 
Table  7 constitutes  the heart  of the empirical  findings.  Sick plants, it 
shows, get well, provided  that they change owners. But in fact this is 
subject  to some question:  the sample  involved  here follows these plants 
from  year seven before  the year of initial  change  to year seven after  the 
change. This is a constantly  evolving sample. The plants  in the sample 
changed  ownership  between 1973  and 1974. They thus represent  only 
one year's data. If a different  year is chosen-1972,  say-one  gets a 
different  sample.  This suggests that it is worth  looking  very carefully  at 
the sample  associated with each of these different  findings.  It could be 
just the evolution  of the sample  in some way. An observation  that  I will 
allude  to later  suggests  something  like this might  be going  on. 
The  authors  note  that  an  ownership  change  occurring  late  in  the sample 
period has an insignificant  effect in improving  performance  and that 
more  than  one ownership  change  has less effect than  a single  ownership 
change. Why?  There  does not seem to be very much  of an explanation. 
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the mean and conclude that cannot  explain  their  results. They also test 
for errors  and  variables  in the measurement  of productivity,  finding  that 
bias is present and that it can to some extent be counteracted  by using 
instrumental  variables  techniques. 
As one looks at total  factor  productivity  in table  7 one sees differences 
in mean growth rates of output, input, and productivity  between the 
changers  and  the  nonchangers.  (Keep  in  mind  that  the  changers  represent 
about  20  percent  of the sample.)  Interestingly,  the so-called  sick plants- 
those that changed  ownership-were getting  well before the ownership 
change. In fact, they had about a half a per-centage  point higher  growth 
rate  than  the firms  that  did not change. 
A macroeconomist  of the Chicago school would have no problem 
with  this at all. Plant  managers  could see ownership  change  approaching 
and were ready. They began shaping  up so that when the new owners 
arrived,  they would be able to retain their amenities and perquisites. 
After the ownership change, as table 7 shows, there is indeed some 
increase in annual  productivity  growth, at least for the first few years, 
and that does help close the gap. After four years or so, however, a 
relapse  sets in. Then, in the seventh  year, total  factor  productivity  grows 
again.  I do not take  the numbers  from  years  four  through  seven seriously. 
The authors  obviously  do not either. But the results  for the years before 
the ownership  change  do seem to throw  some cool, if not cold, water  on 
the interpretation  of the matching  hypothesis. 
Early in the paper the authors state that "ownership change is 
primarily  a mechanism  for correcting  lapses of efficiency. Most acqui- 
sitions are precipitated  by a deterioration  in the target  firm's  economic 
performance.  Deteriorating  productivity  provides  an important  signal  to 
a plant's owner that for some reason he is operating  in a less efficient 
manner  than  an alternative  parent  could." Well, whatever  is going  on in 
the data, it is not that these plants have experienced  a deterioration,  at 
least as measured by changes in total factor productivity, in their 
economic  performance.  Quite the contrary,  they seem to have experi- 
enced a resurgence,  albeit  from  a low initial  level of economic perform- 
ance. And that resurgence continues until the time the change in 
ownership  occurs. 
After  the change, productivity  accelerates  for about three years and 
then drops.  Rather  than  a signal  that should  lead to a maddening  search 
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My conclusion  is not that  there  is some basic deficiency  in the study. 
It presents  extremely  interesting  empirical  results  that  will stimulate  all 
of us to look for ways to cope with classic problems  of the response of 
economic performance  to change in work rules or ownership  or other 
situations.  Exploitation  of the LED set is an enterprise  that  deserves our 
wholehearted  support. 
Edwin Mansfield: In this interesting paper, Frank Lichtenberg and 
Donald  Siegel show that,  for  plants  in the Census  Bureau's  Longitudinal 
Establishment  Data  file that  survive  from 1974  to 1980,  the mean  annual 
rate of productivity  increase  was higher  for plants  that  changed  owners 
than for those that did not. They also show that plants with relatively 
low initial  (1973)  productivity  levels were more  likely to be sold at least 
once between 1974  and 1980.  They conclude that "Evidence pertaining 
to the determinants  and effects of these transfers  is consistent with the 
empirical  implications  of a matching  theory  of plant  turnover.  That  is, a 
firm  lacking  a comparative  advantage  with respect to a given plant  will 
sell it to another  corporation,  leading  on average  to an improvement  in 
the plant's  economic  performance." 
To begin with, one should  note some possible biases in the authors' 
results because of their omission of plants that close. According to 
census data, in a five-year  period about 30 percent of all plants close. 
The probability  is particularly  high among small and young plants.  ' Of 
course, one reason plants close is that their productivity  is too low to 
remain competitive. If this is a very important  reason, the authors' 
finding  that  the mean  annual  rate  of productivity  increase  was higher  for 
sold than for unsold plants  may be due in part  to such a bias. Since, as 
the authors  demonstrate,  the level of productivity  at the beginning  of the 
period tends to be lower for plants that were sold than for those that 
were not sold, a plant that was sold would be more likely to go out of 
business if its productivity  fell by a substantial  percentage  than  would  a 
plant  that  was not sold. Consequently,  even if the  probability  distribution 
of the rate of productivity  change  each year were the same for sold and 
unsold plants (when all plants, not just survivors, are included), the 
average  productivity  increase  would tend to be higher  among  sold than 
1.  Timothy Dunne, Mark J. Roberts, and Larry W. Samuelson,  "The Impact of Plant 
Failure on Employment  Growth in the U.S.  Manufacturing Sector,"  unpublished paper 
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unsold surviving  plants because, relative to all unsold plants, a larger 
proportion  of all sold plants with significant  percentage declines in 
productivity  would  close. 
In columns  4 through  6 of table  6 the authors  show that a plant's  rate 
of productivity  increase  is inversely  related  to its initial  level of produc- 
tivity. As I indicated, this relationship  may be due to biases resulting 
from the exclusion of plants that closed. The lower a plant's initial 
productivity  level, the higher  the probability  that  a significant  decline in 
productivity  will put it out of business. Thus the likelihood  that plants 
with serious  percentage  decreases in productivity  will be excluded  from 
the analysis tends to be inversely related to their initial productivity 
level. 
Even when the authors hold constant a plant's initial productivity 
level, as they do in table 6, there is no assurance that the observed 
difference between sold and unsold plants is not due in part to such 
biases. Whether the biases exist is impossible to say, based on the 
authors' paper, and it may be hard to obtain the data necessary to 
estimate their size because of difficulties  in obtaining  information  on 
productivity  changes  among  plants  that  have  closed. Obviously,  it would 
be worthwhile  for the authors to do what they can to estimate these 
biases, even very roughly, since they bear directly on their central 
conclusion  that  "ownership  change  plays  an  important  role  in redeeming 
inefficient  plants." 
Turning  to the matching  theory of plant  turnover,  it is hard  to square 
the theory with the authors' statistical  results in table 7. According  to 
them, a low level of productivity  indicates a poor match and induces 
ownership  change. Yet in table 7 it appears  that plants sold in year t 
enjoyed  a higher  average  rate of productivity  increase than the unsold 
plants  in the previous  five years.2  Why  then were the plants  not sold five 
years  before,  when  their  productivity  levels were  lower  relative  to unsold 
plants  than in year t? Part of the answer may lie in the lower rates of 
output  growth  of the sold plants  between time t -  5 and time t, but this 
suggests that the authors may have to include more variables than 
2.  While only one of these five figures is statistically significant, the probability that all 
five would be positive, given that there was no difference between  sold and unsold plants 
in the average rate of productivity increase, would seem to be small. Certainly, there is no 
evidence  that the average rate of productivity increase  during this five-year period was 
lower among sold plants than among those unsold. 680  Br-ookings Papers  oni Economnic  Activity,  3:1987 
productivity  alone to explain  plant  turnover  and to estimate  the effects 
of productivity  on plant  turnover. 
Throughout  the paper  the authors  stress the relevance  of their  results 
for evaluating  mergers  and  acquisitions.  While  their  results  are relevant 
to this important  topic, many of the effects of a merger  or acquisition 
may also show up in the nature  and range of a firm's products, in the 
plants it operates  and the ones it closes down, in the allocation  of work 
among  plants  (domestic  and  foreign),  and  in  a host  of financial,  marketing, 
R&D, and other matters  that are reflected  incompletely  in the authors' 
data. 
There  is thus  a great  opportunity  for additional  analysis  of the reasons 
for the apparent  increase in efficiency due to new management.  As an 
illustration,  consider the proposition  put forth by some observers that 
American  firms in recent years have tended to down-size plants and 
locate high-cost  manufacturing  activities abroad.  To what extent is the 
apparently  higher  productivity  due to a change  in the range  of manufac- 
turing  activities carried  out by the plants  that were sold? For example, 
to what extent is the higher  efficiency due simply to their transferring 
certain activities to areas with lower wages rather  than increasing  the 
efficiency  of the activities currently  or previously  being carried  out? It 
would be useful to know the extent to which the apparently  higher 
productivity  was due  not  to improved  methods  but  to a change  in  product 
and  process mix resulting  from  the transfer  of operations  overseas.3 
To explore these and other questions, the authors might carry out 
their analysis at a more disaggregated  level. Given that their sample 
consists of more  than  20,000  plants,  they have  the opportunity  to analyze 
perhaps  twenty  major  industries  separately.  One  would  expect  the  results 
to differ  from  industry  to industry,  and  these differences  should  provide 
valuable clues concerning the reasons for the apparent increase in 
efficiency  from  new management.  It would  also be interesting  to stratify 
the sample  by firm  size and  to carry  out the statistical  analysis  separately 
for large and small plants. This might allow rough  judgments on the 
nature  and size of the biases resulting  from  the fact that  the plants  in this 
sample are ten to twelve times as large (in terms of employment  and 
output)  as the typical  manufacturing  plant. Given this disparity  in plant 
3.  Such changes in activities  and product and process  mix can readily occur without 
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size, the reader  may not wish to generalize  from the authors' results. 
However, if it can be shown  that  there  is little  difference  between  results 
based on only the larger  firms  in the sample  and  those based on only the 
smaller  ones, the reader  may  feel less uneasy. 
Further, it would be interesting  to relate the size of the apparent 
increase  in productivity  due to new management  to the nationality  of the 
buyer  and the seller. There  are, of course, many stories concerning  the 
success of Japanese  firms  in  turning  around  foreign  plants.4 For  example, 
Mitsubishi  Corporation  acquired  an auto assembly plant in Adelaide, 
Australia,  in the late 1970s  from Chrysler  Corporation,  which had been 
operating  it at a loss. Mitsubishi  promoted  greater  interaction  of man- 
agers  and  workers,  eliminated  several  layers  of the  organization,  installed 
ajust-in-time  production  system, and adopted  a variety  of other  organi- 
zational  changes.  By 1981,  according  to a McKinsey  study, productivity 
increased 115 percent, the number  of assembly hours per car fell by 
almost  60 percent, and market  share  increased  from 9 to 13  percent.5  If 
the authors  can identify the nationality  of the buyers and sellers, they 
may be able to shed new light on whether  and to what extent Japanese 
and other foreign firms have been more successful than Americans  in 
raising  the productivity  of the U.S. plants  they buy. 
Lichtenberg  and Siegel have produced  an interesting  paper.  There  is, 
as always, room for a more detailed and disaggregated  analysis of the 
data  they use, and  it would  be helpful  if data  could  be obtained  for plants 
that closed, but the paper  as it stands is a significant  contribution  to an 
important  area  of research. 
4.  For  some  discussion  of  foreign  direct  investment  and technology  transfer,  see 
Edwin Mansfield and others,  Technology  Transfer, Productivity,  and Economic  Policy 
(Norton, 1982). For some recent studies comparing the innovation and diffusion processes 
in Japan and the United States,  see Mansfield, "Industrial R&D in Japan and the United 
States: A Comparative Study," Amesrican  Economnic  Review (May 1988); Mansfield, "The 
Speed  and Cost  of Industrial Innovation  in Japan and the  United  States:  External  vs. 
Internal Technology,"  Management  Science (forthcoming); Mansfield, "The Diffusion of 
Industrial Robots  in  Japan  and  the  United  States,"  unpublished  paper  (Center  for 
Economics  and Technology,  University  of Pennsylvania,  1987); Mansfield, "Technolog- 
ical  Change  in  Robotics:  Japan  and  the  United  States,"  Manager-ial and  Decision 
Economics  (forthcoming); and "Firm Growth, Innovation,  and R&D in Robotics:  Japan 
and the United States,"  Symposium  on Research  and Development,  Industrial Change, 
and Public Policy (University of Karlstad, Sweden,  1987). 
5.  Steven C. Wheelwright, "Restoring the Competitive Edge in U.S. Manufacturing," 
in David J. Teece,  ed.,  The Competitive Challenge:  Strategies for Industrial Innovation 
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General Discussion 
A number of participants  expressed concerned that the authors' 
findings  might  be a result  of a sampling  bias, in that the sample  did not 
include plants that were closed before the end of the sample period. 
Joseph Stiglitz suggested, for example, that an alternative  explanation 
of the authors'  results might  be that  productivity  changes  are a random 
walk. When  productivity  was falling  or low, the frequency  of changes  in 
ownership  increased.  If productivity  continued  to fall after  a change,  the 
plant  dropped  from  the sample  because it shut  down, whereas  if produc- 
tivity stayed  the same  or  rose, the plant  stayed  in the sample.  The  results, 
which are conditional  on the plant's staying  in the sample, would then 
show an average  improvement  in productivity  for  firms  that  experienced 
a change of ownership, but management  would not be causing this 
improvement. 
The authors did not know what proportion  of plants closed down 
during  the sampling  interval, though they noted that, in general, the 
failure rate for large plants was very low, and that their sample was 
dominated  by large  plants. 
Participants  were also very interested  in the significance  of multiple 
changes in ownership. F. M. Scherer noted that his own work with 
David Ravenscraft  indicated  that it is important  to distinguish  among 
three  types of ownership  changes-original voluntary  mergers,  sell-offs 
of parts of firms, and involuntary  mergers or takeovers. Voluntary 
mergers, he said, tended to be preceded by rising profit performance 
and, perhaps,  peak performance  at the time of ownership  change, and 
then  declining  performance.  Sell-offs  tended  to be preceded  by declining 
performance  before the change and rising performance  afterward.  He 
proposed that those plants in the sample that experienced multiple 
ownership changes might have experienced mergers that went bad 
quickly. 
The authors  pointed  out that in 95 percent  of cases of two ownership 
changes both changes took place within a single year. They conceded 
that  this could have been an artifact  of the way ownership  changes  were 
coded in the data. Or, as Paul  Joskow suggested, it could indicate  that 
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process in which  the parent  firm  was acquired  as a package  and  the parts 
that  did  not  fit  the  new  parent  company's  business  strategy  were  profnptly 
sold off. The authors'  matching  model would be inappropriate  in these 
cases. 
Joskow also pointed out that the Longitudinal  Establishment  Data 
are not always  clear  as to what  is meant  by a change  in ownership.  If one 
firm  acquired  another  but treated it as an independent,  wholly owned 
subsidiary,  that might  not be counted as a change of ownership. How- 
ever, if a firm  spun off a line of business and capitalized  it separately, 
turning  it into a wholly owned subsidiary,  that  would probably  count as 
a change  of ownership. 
A number  of participants  were puzzled by the results reported in 
tables 5 and 7. Table 5 shows that the level of total factor productivity 
for plants that change owners falls relative to industry  averages in the 
years before the change, then rises afterward.  Table 7 shows that the 
growth rates of total factor productivity  tend to be above average for 
their  industry  before  the change,  and  then  possibly  to decline  afterward. 
Ariel  Pakes  noted  that  the two measures  were computed  differently,  and 
that  these differences  might  lead to disparate  results. 
Frank Lichtenberg  asked if anyone could offer an explanation  for 
why market  shares  of plants  would  decline  before  a change  in ownership. 
Richard  Schmalensee  argued  that  the other  results  of table  7 might  shed 
some light  on this problem.  The table shows that new investment  slows 
down  just before an ownership  change, suggesting  that the plants may 
have  been reasonably  efficient  technically  but  were  producing  the wrong 
products  or products  that  the owner  did not know how to design, sell, or 
distribute  well. Then the matching  process would have to do with new 
owners coming  in who could put the assets to slightly  different  uses or 
handle  the output  better. 
Peter  Reiss also expressed interest  in what it is that new owners do. 
He suggested that there may be information  in the evidence on the 
changing  composition  of inputs that could shed light on this question. 
Moreover, the authors have data on wages and salaries that could 
provide  evidence on the question  of whether  ownership  changes  lead to 
the abrogation  of certain  contracts. Reiss also suggested that it would 
be informative  for the authors  to compare  the performance  of plants  that 
change  owners and other plants whose productivity  is low but that do 
not change  owners. 